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Intrinsic Evidence: Do Utah Prosecutors Too Often 
Neglect This Avenue of Admissibility? 
Blake R. Hills* 
fK==fkqolar`qflk=
In a domestic violence case in which a defendant has previously 
committed violent acts against the victim, the prosecutor will generally 
seek to introduce evidence of those prior violent acts in the trial for the 
new offenses. Likewise, a prosecutor would usually seek to introduce 
evidence that a defendant had previously distributed narcotics into that 
defendant’s trial for possession of narcotics with intent to distribute. 
In both cases, the prosecutor would attempt to introduce the evidence 
under Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which states: 
Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a 
person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the 
person acted in conformity with the character. This evidence may be 
admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or 
lack of accident. On request by a defendant in a criminal case, the 
prosecutor must: provide reasonable notice of the general nature of 
any such evidence that the prosecutor intends to offer at trial; and do 
so before trial, or during trial if the court excuses lack of pretrial no-
tice on good cause shown.1 
However, is this automatic turning to Rule 404(b) the right choice? 
In automatically turning to Rule 404(b), do prosecutors ignore another 
avenue for the introduction of the evidence? 
Part II of this article examines the Utah case law that addresses the 
interplay between intrinsic evidence and Rule 404(b). Part III discusses 
the specific categories of intrinsic evidence that other courts have 
found are not subject to Rule 404(b) analysis. Part IV suggests that in 
automatically turning to Rule 404(b), prosecutors miss another avenue 
 
 *  Prosecuting Attorney, Summit County Attorney’s Office. J.D., S.J. Quinney Univer-
sity of Utah College of Law (1998). The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely 
those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Summit County Attorney’s Office. 
 1. UTAH R. EVID. 404(b). 
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for seeking the introduction of evidence. Specifically, prosecutors 
should first consider arguing that the evidence is admissible because it 
is intrinsic to the crime charged, rather than simply turning to Rule 
404(b). Finally, Part V outlines the procedure for seeking admission of 
intrinsic evidence. 
ffK==rq^e=`^pb=i^t=
Utah appellate courts first engaged in meaningful analysis of this 
issue in State v. Burke.2 In Burke, the State charged the defendant with 
sexually abusing a child and her aunt.3 The State introduced evidence 
that a few hours before sexually assaulting the victims, the defendant 
asked another woman for her phone number and stroked and caressed 
her arm against her wishes in order to show that the crimes were part 
of a pattern of behavior involving increasingly aggressive and oppor-
tunistic transgressions of sexual boundaries.4 The State also introduced 
evidence that the defendant had used the homeowner’s computer to 
access pornography on the night of the offenses.5 
The Court of Appeals found that a “direct relationship” between 
the uncharged conduct with the woman and the charged crimes was 
“readily discernable: when considered together, the events illustrate a 
distinct behavioral arc of increasingly aggressive and opportunistic 
transgressions of sexual boundaries, apparently fueled by mounting 
frustration . . . .”6 The court held that the behavioral arc showed the 
defendant’s purpose or motivation, which was a central element of the 
charged offenses.7 
The defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion in 
admitting evidence of his conduct with the woman and evidence that 
he accessed pornography on the computer because the State failed to 
give notice under Rule 404(b) that it intended to introduce the evi-
dence.8 The court noted that under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
“Rule 404(b) does not apply where the challenged evidence is ‘inextri-
cably intertwined’ with evidence of the crime charged.”9 The court 
 
 2. 256 P.3d 1102 (Utah Ct. App. 2011). 
 3. Id. at 1108. 
 4. Id. at 1112–13. 
 5. Id. at 1110. 
 6. Id. at 1113. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 1124. 
 9. Id. 
(4) HILLS.FINAL ARTICLE, POST PROOF, 2.6.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2019  4:43 PM 
81] Intrinsic Evidence 
83 
further noted that “[o]ther act evidence is intrinsic when the evidence 
of the other act and the evidence of the crime charged are inextricably 
intertwined or both acts are part of a single criminal episode or the acts 
were necessary preliminaries to the crime charged” or the other acts 
are “part of a continuing pattern of illegal activity.”10 
Because the defendant failed to address the issue on appeal, the 
court did not ultimately decide whether Utah’s Rule 404(b) has the 
same distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic evidence.11 However, 
the court did note that Utah’s Rule 404(b) is verbatim to its                
Federal counterpart.12 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed Burke’s unanswered ques-
tion in State v. Lucero.13 In Lucero, the defendant was charged with 
the murder and child abuse of her two-year-old son.14 The State 
sought to introduce evidence of a prior incident of child abuse in order 
to prove the identity of the perpetrator of the charged offenses.15 The 
trial court ruled that the evidence was admissible, and the defendant 
appealed her subsequent conviction.16 
The State argued on appeal that the trial court’s decision should 
be upheld because the evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b) to 
prove identity and, alternatively, that it was admissible as part of the 
continuing narrative.17 The Supreme Court stated: 
Since rule 404(b) applies only “to evidence that is extrinsic to the 
crime charged,” this would preclude applicability of the rule               
altogether. This is because rule 404(b) applies only to “other” acts—
if the evidence of prior acts is “inextricably intertwined” with the 
crime that is charged, or if both the charged crime and the prior act 
are considered “part of a single criminal episode,” then rule 404(b) 
would not apply. Rather, the act would be considered part of the case  
 
 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 1125 n.18. 
 12. Id. at 1124. 
 13. 328 P.3d 841 (Utah 2014), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton, 391 P.3d 
1016 (Utah 2017). The abrogated part of Lucero and other cases was the requirement that the 
trial court perform a “scrupulous examination” when determining whether evidence is admissible 
under Rule 404(b). Id. at 1025–26. 
 14. Lucero, 328 P.3d at 847. 
 15. Id. at 851. 
 16. Id. at 849–50. 
 17. Id. at 850 n.7. 
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narrative and have important probative value that bears directly on 
the crime charged.18 
This statement by the Supreme Court—that Rule 404(b) does not 
apply to evidence that is intrinsic to the crime charged—answered 
Burke’s question in the affirmative.19 
Burke and Lucero demonstrate that Utah’s Rule 404(b) is not ap-
plicable to evidence that is intrinsic to the crime charged. The fact that 
there is little Utah case law on this legal principle20 demonstrates that 
it is little understood and generally overlooked. A better understand-
ing of this principle can be gained by looking at examples from other 
state and federal courts. 
fffK==lqebo=`^pb=i^t=
Under American law, intrinsic evidence has traditionally been ad-
mitted under specified circumstances.21 It is important to remember 
that there is a profound distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic ev-
idence when determining whether Rule 404(b) applies. 
Generally speaking, [i]ntrinsic evidence is directly connected to the 
factual circumstances of the crime and provides contextual or back-
ground information to the jury. Extrinsic evidence, on the other 
hand, is extraneous and is not intimately connected or blended with 
the factual circumstances of the charged offense. Because Rule 404(b) 
only limits evidence of ‘other’ crimes—those extrinsic to the charged 
crime—evidence of acts or events that are part of the crime itself, or 
evidence essential to the context of the crime, does not fall under the 
other crimes limitations of Rule 404(b).22 
 
 18. Id. (citing United States v. Mower, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1230 (D. Utah 2005)). 
 19. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the prior incident of child abuse was not 
intrinsic to the crime charged because it was “disconnected” from the charged offenses and was 
used only to prove identity. Id. 
 20. For instance, the Utah Court of Appeals rejected an argument that the defendant’s 
gang activity was not subject to Rule 404(b) analysis in State v. High, 282 P.3d 1046 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2012). The court offered little analysis other than stating that the evidence of gang activity 
was not “inextricably intertwined” with the charged crime because there was no evidence that the 
victims were members of a rival gang. Id. at 1054. 
 21. See Thomas M. DiBiagio, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence in Federal Criminal Trials: 
Is the Admission of Collateral Other-Crimes Evidence Disconnected to the Fundamental Right 
to a Fair Trial?, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1229, 1231–33 (1997). 
 22. United States v. Parker, 553 F.3d 1309, 1314–15 (10th Cir. 2009) (citations and inter-
nal quotations omitted). See also, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 190 (7th ed. 2016) (“[T]here 
is no rule against admitting evidence of other crimes per se—the rule excluding proof of other 
crimes is confined to evidence of extrinsic crimes that are probative only through propensity 
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When determining whether evidence is intrinsic to the crime 
charged, Utah courts can look to examples from other courts. Other 
courts have determined that evidence was intrinsic when it: (1) was in-
extricably intertwined with the charged crime; (2) provided direct 
proof of the defendant’s involvement in the charged crime; (3) oc-
curred during the same criminal episode as the charged crime; (4) was 
a necessary preliminary to the charged crime; (5) was background in-
formation directly connected to the factual circumstance of the 
charged crime; (6) was necessary to provide the jury with the context 
in which the charged crime was committed; or (7) explained relation-
ships between co-defendants. It should be noted that these categories 
may overlap in certain cases and there may be more than one basis for 
a court to find that evidence is intrinsic. 
A.  Inextricably Intertwined 
Courts treat evidence that is inextricably intertwined with the 
crime charged as being outside the scope of Rule 404(b). This category 
applies when the uncharged misconduct “is an inseparable part of the 
crime charged, or is otherwise not wholly independent from the 
crime charged, even though the conduct is not referred to explicitly in 
the charging document.”23 
In United States v. Warren, the defendant was charged with mur-
der.24 At trial, the court allowed the prosecution to introduce evidence 
that the defendant stabbed a second victim immediately after stabbing 
the first, even though the defendant faced no charges for stabbing the 
second victim.25 The defendant claimed on appeal that the admission 
 
reasoning.”). 
 23. Jennifer Y. Schuster, Uncharged Misconduct Under Rule 404(b): The Admissibility 
of Inextricably Intertwined Evidence, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 947, 961 (1988). See also Edward J. 
Imwinkelried, The Second Coming of Res Gestae: A Procedural Approach to Untangling the 
“Inextricably Intertwined” Theory for Admitting Evidence of an Accused’s Uncharged Miscon-
duct, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 719, 725 (2010) (stating that when the prosecution argues that evi-
dence of uncharged misconduct is “inextricably intertwined” with the crime charged, the prose-
cution is arguing that the evidence is so closely related that the court should admit evidence of 
the uncharged misconduct); 1 UTAH PRAC., MANGRUM & BENSON ON UTAH EVIDENCE RULE 
404, [D](8)(c)(ix)(e) (October 2017 Update) (“Crimes that ‘are so linked with the crime charged 
in point of time and circumstances that one cannot be shown without proving the other’ are 
admissible irrespective of Rule 404(b).”) (citations omitted). 
 24. 25 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 25. Id. The defendant had previously been convicted of murder and attempted murder for 
stabbing both victims, but the murder conviction was vacated while the attempted murder con-
viction was upheld, leaving only the murder charge to be retried. Id. at 894. 
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of evidence about the stabbing of the second victim violated Rule 
404(b).26 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Rule 404(b) 
was not applicable because the evidence of stabbing the second victim 
was “inextricably intertwined” with evidence of the murder, stating: 
Evidence should not be treated as “other crimes” evidence when the 
evidence concerning the [“other”] act and the evidence concerning 
the crime charged are inextricably intertwined. The stabbing of [the 
second victim] is inextricably intertwined with the stabbing of [the 
first]. Both were part of a single course of action and occurred within 
moments of each other. Offenses committed in a single criminal ep-
isode do not become inadmissible because the defendant is being 
tried for only some of his acts.27 
In United States v. Kupfer, the defendant was charged with con-
spiring with a media consultant to steal funds under a government con-
tract.28 The prosecution was allowed to introduce evidence at trial of a 
separate uncharged conspiracy involving a second government con-
tract to show that the consultant used funds from the second contract 
to pay the defendant for his involvement in the charged conspiracy.29 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Rule 404(b) 
was not applicable and the evidence was admissible because it “was in-
extricably intertwined with the charged conduct.”30 
B.  Proof of the Defendant’s Involvement in the Charged Crime 
Courts consider evidence of uncharged misconduct to be intrinsic 
and not subject to Rule 404(b) if it specifically ties the defendant to the 
charged offense. 
In United States v. Parker, the defendant was charged with con-
spiracy and other crimes for a scheme involving false representations 
in the sale of small aircraft engines.31 The government was allowed to 
introduce evidence that the defendant had made other fraudulent sales 
during the same period of time as the sales for which he was charged 
with conspiracy and other crimes.32 The defendant argued on appeal 
 
 26. Id. at 895. 
 27. Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
 28. 797 F.3d 1233, 1235–36 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 29. Id. at 1237–38. 
 30. Id. at 1238. 
 31. 553 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 32. Id. at 1314. 
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that the admission of the evidence of the uncharged fraudulent sales 
violated Rule 404(b), but the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disa-
greed.33 The court held that evidence of the uncharged fraudulent sales 
was “intrinsic to the crime” because it substantiated the conspiracy that 
was charged and provided direct proof that the defendant was a part of 
the conspiracy.34 The court stated: “The sales were not merely contex-
tual, they supported elements of the charged crimes. Rule 404(b) only 
applies to evidence of ‘other’ crimes—the transactions were part of the 
crimes charged, not some other crime.”35 
In the West Virginia case of State v. Harris, the defendant was 
charged with two counts of sexually abusing a child during a several-
year time period.36 At trial, the victim testified that the defendant had 
committed other, uncharged sexual assaults against her.37 The defend-
ant argued on appeal that this evidence was inadmissible because it    
violated Rule 404(b).38 The West Virginia Supreme Court held that 
this evidence was intrinsic to the crimes that were charged.39 The court 
held that the evidence was intrinsic because it helped to refute the      
defendant’s assertions that he was not present during the time period 
of the charged offenses and that someone other than him abused    
the victim.40 
C.  Same Criminal Episode 
Under this category, courts hold that evidence of uncharged mis-
conduct is intrinsic to the crime charged and not subject to Rule 404(b) 
if it is part of the same criminal episode. This category encompasses 
misconduct that took place contemporaneously with the charged crime 
or was part of the same transactions as the charged crime.41 
In United States v. Cancelliere, the defendant was charged with 
bank fraud, false statements, and money laundering.42 The prosecution 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 1315. 
 35. Id. 
 36. 742 S.E.2d 133, 135 (W. Va. 2013). 
 37. Id. at 136. 
 38. Id. at 137. 
 39. Id. at 139. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See Schuster, supra note 23, at 964. 
 42. 69 F.3d 1116, 1118 (11th Cir. 1995). 
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introduced evidence at trial that the defendant engaged in similar un-
charged activities and had made false statements.43 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that the evidence was intrinsic and not sub-
ject to Rule 404(b) because the uncharged misconduct was “part of the 
manner and means by which [the defendant] carried out his scheme 
to defraud.”44 
In United States v. Derring, the defendant was charged with inter-
state transportation of stolen motor vehicles.45 At trial, the prosecution 
presented evidence that the defendant had murdered the owner of one 
of the vehicles in another state and had tried to dispose of the vehicle 
because it was “hot”.”46 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
this evidence was admissible and was not governed by Rule 404(b) be-
cause the murder of the vehicle owner, and the theft of and attempt to 
dispose of the vehicle were part of a single criminal transaction that 
occurred together with the charged interstate transportation over a 
four-day period.47 The court stated: 
If several crimes are intermixed, or blended with one another, or con-
nected so that they form an indivisible criminal transaction, and full 
proof by testimony, whether direct or circumstantial, of any one of 
them cannot be given without showing the others, evidence of any or 
all of them is admissible against a defendant on trial for an offense 
which is itself a detail of the whole criminal scheme.48 
D.  Necessary Preliminary Step 
Under this category, evidence of uncharged misconduct is intrinsic 
and exempt from Rule 404(b) when the evidence was a prelude to or 
was a necessary preliminary step to the charged crime. 
In United States v. Lambert, the defendant was charged with rob-
bing a bank with an accomplice in early January.49 The accomplice tes-
tified that he and the defendant began discussions about robbing a 
bank just after Christmas, and while they were in a supermarket with a 
bank located inside on January 3, the defendant stated that he had seen 
 
 43. Id. at 1123–24. 
 44. Id. at 1124. 
 45. 592 F.2d 1003, 1004 (8th Cir. 1979). 
 46. Id. at 1006. 
 47. Id. at 1007. 
 48. Id. (citation omitted). 
 49. 995 F.2d 1006, 1007 (10th Cir. 1993). 
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a man in the supermarket with lots of money in a bag and he could 
“slam the guy and take the bag.”50 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that this testimony was properly admitted, and it was not subject 
to 404(b) analysis because the discussion in the one- to two-week pe-
riod before the robbery was intrinsic to the charged crime since it “oc-
curred in the preliminary planning of the bank robbery.”51 The fact 
that the discussion did not focus on the bank that was ultimately 
robbed was not dispositive, because it was part of deciding how and 
when to undertake a robbery.52 
In United States v. Torres, the defendants were charged with con-
spiracy and selling a kilogram of cocaine.53 At trial, the prosecution 
introduced evidence that the defendants had been involved in two ear-
lier sales of smaller amounts of cocaine.54 The Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that the earlier transactions were intrinsic to the charged 
crimes and not subject to Rule 404(b) because they were “necessary 
preliminaries” during which the plans for the charged sale were laid.55 
E.  Background 
Courts have found that evidence is intrinsic, and not subject to 
Rule 404(b) when the evidence constitutes background information di-
rectly connected to the factual circumstance of the charged crime. 
In United States v. Irving, the defendant was charged with both 
possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute and with witness 
tampering for seeking the death of a police lieutenant.56 At trial, the 
prosecution introduced evidence that the lieutenant had been involved 
in a prior drug-related investigation of the defendant.57 The defendant 
argued that the evidence was inadmissible under Rule 404(b) because 
it did not establish any element of the crimes for which he was 
charged.58 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, and held 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 1008. 
 52. Id. 
 53. 685 F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 54. Id. at 923. 
 55. Id. at 924. 
 56. 665 F.3d 1184, 1187–88 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 57. Id. at 1210. 
 58. Id. at 1211. 
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that Rule 404(b) was not applicable because the evidence was intrin-
sic.59 The court stated: 
We have never required that the other-act evidence establish an       
element of the charged offense. Rather, intrinsic evidence is that 
which is “directly connected to the factual circumstances of the crime 
and provides contextual or background information to the jury.      
Extrinsic evidence, on the other hand, is extraneous and is not           
intimately connected or blended with the factual circumstances of the 
charged offense.60 
The court also held that the evidence of the prior drug-related in-
vestigation was important background information for the jury: 
In this case, Mr. Irving was charged with a drug offense arising from 
a 2008 transaction, and yet two witnesses testified that Mr. Irving had 
sought the death of Lt. Stark as early as 2006. Without the proper 
context, this could have created understandable confusion with the 
jury. The government sought to avoid this by using Lt. Stark’s testi-
mony to both explain why Mr. Irving would have wanted him killed 
in 2006 and to further illuminate Mr. Irving’s ongoing motivation . . . 
to retaliate against Lt. Stark. Lt. Stark’s testimony formed an “‘inte-
gral and natural part of the witness[es]” accounts of the circumstances 
surrounding the offense for which the defendant was indicted. It is 
entirely germane background information, which is directly con-
nected to the factual circumstances of the crime, and thus is intrinsic 
to the crime at issue. Thus, Rule 404(b) is inapplicable.61 
In United States v. Weeks, the defendant was charged with “as-
saulting a federal officer with a deadly weapon.”62 The prosecution in-
troduced evidence “that the [federal] agent was investigating stolen 
motor vehicles at the time of the assault.”63 The Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that the evidence was not extrinsic evidence gov-
erned by Rule 404(b): 
In this case, the investigation into stolen vehicles explained the 
agent’s presence with Weeks and his associates, and their animosity 
towards the agent. The investigation was inextricably linked to the 
charged offense of assault, was reasonably necessary to complete the  
 
 
 59. Id. at 1212–13. 
 60. Id. at 1212 (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
 61. Id. at 1212–13 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
 62. 716 F.2d 830, 831 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 63. Id. at 832. 
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story of the crime, and therefore was not extrinsic under 
Rule 404(b).64 
F.  Context 
Under this category, uncharged misconduct evidence is intrinsic, 
and not subject to Rule 404(b), when it explains the context of the 
crime to the jury.65 “Without the admission of this evidence, the pros-
ecution would be unable to present a coherent and comprehensive 
story regarding the commission of the crime to the jury.”66 
In the West Virginia case of State v. McKinley, the defendant was 
charged with the murder of his girlfriend, who was the mother of his 
child.67 At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of two prior inci-
dents of domestic violence committed by the defendant against the vic-
tim.68 The first incident involved the defendant strangling the victim 
two months before the murder, and the second involved the defendant 
pushing the victim down a hill one month before the murder.69 The 
West Virginia Supreme Court held that this evidence was intrinsic ev-
idence, which was not subject to Rule 404(b). The court stated: 
Although the two domestic violence incidents in this case were not a 
“single criminal episode,” we believe this evidence was necessary to 
place [the victim]’s death in context with her relationship with Mr. 
McKinley, and to complete the story of the violence Mr. McKinley 
inflicted on her.70 
In United States v Hall, the defendant and co-defendant, Woods, 
were charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute after 
they were caught transporting four kilograms of cocaine in the spare 
 
 64. Id. (citations omitted). 
 65. See DiBiagio, supra note 21, at 1246. 
 66. Id. See also, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 22, at § 190 (“But the question 
remains—Is there any other background information that shows a defendant’s involvement in 
other crimes and that serves a nonpropensity purpose? We think there is. Other-crime evidence 
should be admissible to complete the story if it satisfies ‘the offering party’s need for evidentiary 
richness and narrative integrity in presenting a case.’ This rationale applies: ‘(1) when reference 
to the other crimes is essential to a coherent and intelligible description of the offense at bar, (2) 
when the incomplete story that the defendant would prefer leaves a gap that would frustrate ‘the 
jurors’ expectations about what proper proof should be,’ or (3) when the material in question is 
necessary to a fair understanding of the behavior of individuals involved in the criminal enterprise 
or the events immediately leading up to them.”). 
 67. 764 S.E.2d 303, 307 (W. Va. 2014). 
 68. Id. at 314. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 316. 
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tire of a Ford Explorer.71 At trial, Woods testified that he had pur-
chased cocaine from the defendant about a year before the charged 
offense, and the defendant had told him that he would be willing to 
transport drugs in the future if the need arose.72 The Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that this testimony was intrinsic evidence which 
was not subject to Rule 404(b).73 The court stated, “Generally speak-
ing, intrinsic evidence is that which is directly connected to the factual 
circumstances of the crime and provides contextual background infor-
mation to the jury.”74 The court held that the testimony of co-defend-
ant Woods met this definition: 
[A]t the time of the charged crime, Hall was traveling with Woods in 
Woods’ . . . vehicle transporting four kilograms of cocaine. Less than 
a year prior to this, Hall and Woods had met for the purpose of con-
ducting a drug deal. During this initial encounter, Woods asked Hall 
if he could “make some runs for [Woods] to pick up some co-
caine.” . . . This initial interaction and drug deal is directly connected 
to the factual circumstances of the charged crime and provides con-
textual or background information as to how it came to be that 
Woods contacted Hall to make the drug run in November of 
2010. . . . Evidence of this prior interaction was necessary to provide 
the jury with the background and context of how Hall was involved 
with Woods, the nature of their relationship, and why he was rid-
ing . . . with Woods on November 3, 2010.75 
G.  Relationships Between Co-Defendants 
Courts have found that evidence is intrinsic and not subject to Rule 
404(b) when it is used to explain relationships between those who have 
committed crimes with each other. This category of intrinsic evidence 
“plays a particularly compelling role in conspiracy and racketeering 
prosecutions,” because “it is essential that the prosecution be permit-
ted to inform the jury of the background, existence and structure of 
the enterprise” by showing uncharged misconduct committed      
by co-defendants.76 
 
 71. 508 F. App’x 776, 777 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 779. 
 74. Id. (citation omitted). 
 75. Id. at 779–80 (citations omitted). 
 76. DiBiagio, supra note 21, at 1250. See also id. at 1251 (“Intrinsic evidence is particularly 
appropriate in conspiracy prosecutions where the government’s case is typically dominated by 
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In United States v. Krout, multiple co-defendants, who were mem-
bers of the Texas Mexican Mafia, were charged with racketeering of-
fenses.77 The co-defendants argued on appeal that the admission of ev-
idence about several uncharged murders and an uncharged attempted 
murder violated Rule 404(b) because it was offered to prove bad char-
acter.78 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed.79 The court held 
that the evidence of the murders and attempted murder was not intro-
duced as character evidence, but as acts committed in furtherance of 
the racketeering offenses.80 
The government is not limited in its proof of a conspiracy or racket-
eering enterprise to the overt or racketeering acts alleged in the in-
dictment. [The co-defendants] had all served as “generals” in the 
Texas Mexican Mafia, commanding the members outside of prison 
in San Antonio. Evidence of how disputes were settled with these 
members or how they were treated if believed to be cooperating with 
law enforcement was properly admitted to prove the allegation in the 
indictment that murder and extreme violence were part of the organ-
ization’s pattern of racketeering activities.81 
In United States v. Gibbs, the defendant was charged with several 
conspiracy, drug, and weapons charges.82 The prosecution presented 
evidence at trial from three individuals who testified that they had as-
sisted the defendant in illegal transactions which involved large quan-
tities of cocaine.83 On appeal, the defendant argued that this evidence 
violated Rule 404(b) because the transactions all occurred before “the 
date the government had alleged that the cocaine conspiracy began.”84 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that “evidence 
of activities occurring before the charged time frame of the conspiracy 
 
accomplice testimony. The existence of a trust relationship is typically relevant in a conspiracy 
prosecution because of the government’s use of accomplice/co-conspirator witnesses. Therefore, 
intrinsic evidence often serves to corroborate accomplice testimony by showing the nature of the 
relationship between the defendant and his cooperating accomplices/co-conspirators, explaining 
why the defendant would ask his cooperating accomplices/co-conspirators to commit a crime 
with him and explaining why a defendant would trust these individuals with knowledge of his 
involvement in criminal conduct.”). 
 77. 66 F.3d 1420, 1424 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 78. Id. at 1425. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. 547 F. App’x. 174, 177 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 83. Id. at 180–81. 
 84. Id. at 181. 
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does not automatically transform that evidence into other crimes evi-
dence” subject to Rule 404(b).85 The court held that the challenged ev-
idence was admissible, because it “allowed the jury to understand the 
background of the conspiracy and the extent of the relationship and 
dealings between Gibbs and other relevant players in the conspiracy.”86 
In short, there is a wide variety of evidence that can properly be 
classified as intrinsic evidence that is not subject to Rule 404(b). Pros-
ecutors should consider each category of intrinsic evidence discussed 
above as a potential basis for admitting evidence at trial.  
fsK==tev=fkqofkpf`I=o^qebo=qe^k=QMQE_F=
There are several reasons why prosecutors should seek to intro-
duce intrinsic evidence under one of the categories discussed above, 
rather than seeking introduction under Rule 404(b). First, the 1991 
advisory committee note to Federal Rule 404(b) specifically states that 
the rule “does not extend to evidence of acts which are ‘intrinsic’ to the 
charged offense.”87 Since Utah’s Rule 404(b) is almost identical to the 
Federal rule,88 and the Utah Supreme Court stated in Lucero that 
Utah’s Rule 404(b) “applies only ‘to evidence that is extrinsic to the 
crime charged,’”89 it is clear that the category of evidence that is not 
subject to Rule 404(b) is much more expansive than has traditionally 
been recognized. 
Second, this approach is consistent with the approach taken by 
Utah courts before Rule 404(b) existed. For instance, although the 
Utah Supreme Court did not use the term “intrinsic evidence,” it ap-
plied the principle in the 1947 case State v. Scott.90 In that case, mul-
tiple defendants were charged with unlawfully obtaining money from 
a victim in a confidence game in which two defendants made contact 
with the victim on the street and the others acted as lookouts.91 The 
 
 85. Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
 86. Id. 
 87. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendments. 
 88. There are only two minor stylistic differences between the rules. Utah’s rule uses the 
word “conformity” rather than “accordance” in (b)(1) and reads “if the court excuses lack of pre-
trial notice on good cause shown,” UTAH R. EVID. 404(b), rather than “if the court, for good 
cause, excuses lack of pretrial notice” in (b)(2)(B), FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
 89. State v. Lucero, 328 P.3d 841, 850 n.7 (Utah 2014) (citing United States v. Mower, 
351 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1230 (D. Utah 2005)), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton, 
391 P.3d 1016 (Utah 2017). 
 90. 175 P.2d 1016 (Utah 1947). 
 91. Id. at 1017–18. 
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prosecution introduced evidence that during the five days prior to the 
charged offense, the defendants went through the same activities with 
many other individuals as they did with the victim, with the defendants 
playing varying roles.92 The defendants challenged the introduction of 
this evidence on appeal, claiming that it was unrelated to the charged 
offense and was introduced solely to show bad character and a propen-
sity to commit similar crimes.93 The court disagreed, and held that the 
evidence was admissible because: 
[t]he evidence in this case as to prior acts of the defendants was rele-
vant to the issues of the case for other purposes than merely to show 
the defendants’ disposition to commit crime. The evidence shows 
that all the defendants were acquainted with each other and that to-
gether they had gone thru the same performance with many other 
persons as they went [through with the victim]. Such evidence tends 
to establish that in the [charged offense] the defendants were acting 
according to a predetermined plan and that [the lookout defendants] 
were playing set rules of the scheme though they were some distance 
from [the defendants who made contact with the victim].94 
Third, proceeding under Rule 404(b) is anything but a sure bet 
when it comes to admitting evidence. Indeed, the nearly identical Fed-
eral “Rule 404(b) has generated more reported decisions than any 
other provision of the Federal Rules.”95 There is little difference in 
state courts. “In many jurisdictions, the admissibility of uncharged-
misconduct evidence is not only the most frequently litigated issue on 
appeal, but also the most common ground for reversal.”96 Utah’s own 
 
 92. Id. at 1021. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 1023. The court also stated that in regard to other bad acts evidence, “[t]he basic 
rule of admissibility of evidence is that all evidence having probative value—that is, that tends to 
prove an issue, is admissible.” Id. at 1021. The court added that other bad acts evidence “is ad-
missible not because it comes under an exception to the rule of exclusion but that the rule of 
exclusion is sufficiently narrow that it does not apply to such evidence and the evidence is there-
fore admissible under the basic rule that all evidence having probative value is admissible.” Id. at 
1022. See also State v. Neal, 254 P.2d 1053, 1056–57 (Utah 1953) (stating that other bad acts 
evidence “which rationally tends to prove any material issue . . . should be received if offered for 
an admissible purpose” and “is excluded only where the sole purpose is to show defendant’s pro-
pensity for the commission of crime . . . .”); State v. Harries, 221 P.2d 605, 617 (Utah 1950) (“Any 
pertinent fact which throws light upon the subject under judicial consideration, the accused’s 
guilt or innocence of the crime for which he is charged, is admissible” and “is not to be excluded 
merely because it may also prove or tend to prove that the accused has committed another similar 
crime.”). 
 95. Imwinkelried, supra note 23, at 721. 
 96. Id. (citations omitted). 
(4) HILLS.FINAL ARTICLE, POST PROOF, 2.6.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2019  4:43 PM 
BYU Journal of Public Law=  [Vol. 33 
96 
history with Rule 404(b) has been tortured, to say the least. When 
Utah adopted Rule 55,97 the predecessor to Rule 404(b), the Utah Su-
preme Court held in State v. Forsyth that it was an inclusionary rule.98 
But by the time the Utah Supreme Court decided State v. Shickles, 
Rule 404(b) was viewed as an exclusionary rule.99 The tide shifted 
again, as shown by the Utah Supreme Court’s view in State v. 
Thornton that Rule 404(b) is an inclusionary rule.100 The takeaway is 
that relying solely on Rule 404(b) carries inherent risk. 
sK==fkqolar`fkd=fkqofkpf`=bsfabk`b=
Because Rule 404(b) does not apply to intrinsic evidence, prosecu-
tors are not bound by its notice requirement101 when they seek to in-
troduce this evidence. However, giving notice to the defense is clearly 
the better practice. Prosecutors who fail to alert the defense and the 
court that they will be seeking to introduce intrinsic evidence risk an 
adverse ruling when the issue arises mid-trial and the judge is forced 
 
 97. Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence stated as follows: 
Subject to Rule 47 evidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on a spec-
ified occasion, is inadmissible to prove his disposition to commit crime or civil wrong 
as the basis for an inference that he committed another crime or civil wrong on another 
specified occasion but, subject to Rules 45 and 48, such evidence is absence admissible 
when relevant to prove some other material fact including of mistake or accident, mo-
tive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or identity.  
UTAH R. EVID. 55 (1971). Rules 47 and 48 were concerned with the admission of evidence re-
lated to an individual’s character trait in ways not relevant here. See id. 47, 48. Rule 45, similar 
to current Rule 403, provided that a trial court had “discretion [to] exclude evidence if [the court] 
finds that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission will (a) 
necessitate undue consumption of time, or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of 
confusing the issues or of misleading the jury, or (c) unfairly and harmfully surprise a party . . . .” 
Id. at 45. 
 98. 641 P.2d 1172, 1175–76 (Utah 1982) (citing State v. Scott, 175 P.2d 1016, 1021–22 
(Utah 1947)). 
 99. 760 P.2d 291, 295 (Utah 1988), abrogated by State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484, 497 
(Utah 1997) (stating that under rule 404(b), evidence of other crimes is generally inadmissible 
unless it tends to have a special relevance to a controverted issue and is introduced for a purpose 
other than to show the defendant’s predisposition to criminality). 
 100. 391 P.3d 1016, 1027 (Utah 2017) (“The threshold 404(b) question is whether the ev-
idence has a plausible, avowed purpose beyond the propensity purpose that the rule deems im-
proper. If it does then the evidence is presumptively admissible (subject to rule 402 and 403 anal-
ysis).”). 
 101. See UTAH R. EVID. 404(b)(2)(A)–(B) (“On request by a defendant in a criminal case, 
the prosecutor must: (A) provide reasonable notice of the general nature of any such evidence 
that the prosecutor intends to offer at trial; and (B) do so before trial, or during trial if the court 
excuses lack of pretrial notice on good cause shown.”). 
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to make a ruling without adequate time or preparation.102 At the very 
least, raising the issue for the first time mid-trial can be disruptive to 
the proceedings.103 Therefore, prosecutors should file a pre-trial notice 
of intent when they seek to introduce intrinsic evidence.104 The notice 
should provide a synopsis of the evidence of uncharged misconduct 
and should indicate that the prosecution will be relying on the intrinsic 
evidence doctrine of admissibility.105 
If the defense intends to object to introduction of the evidence de-
scribed in the pre-trial notice, it should file a motion in limine indicat-
ing that it objects. This motion by the defense should contain more 
than just a cursory objection and should provide argument about why 
the evidence is not intrinsic to the crime charged and how the evidence 
can be omitted without rendering associated testimony less credible or 
less understandable.106 A pre-trial evidentiary hearing may be necessary 
in certain cases. 
If the issue is raised and examined in this manner before trial, the 
judge will be able to make a better decision. The judge must begin by 
determining whether the evidence is intrinsic to the crime charged. If 
it is, the judge must still perform the analysis under Rule 403 of the 
 
 102. See Imwinkelried, supra note 23, at 734 (“At trial, the judge may have to resolve a 
difficult editorial question: if the government witness proposes to give his or her account of the 
relevant events, would the deletion of references to the defendant’s uncharged misconduct impair 
the narrative integrity of the account as a whole? . . . Time constraints and the presence of a jury 
understandably generate pressure for relatively quick decisions at trial. In the ‘hurly burly’ of that 
setting, the judge may find it extremely difficult to engage in deliberate, careful editing. In par-
ticular, if he or she attempted the necessary editing at sidebar with a jury impatiently waiting, the 
doctrine is far more likely to be misapplied.”). 
 103. See id. at 731 (“When the issue does arise [mid-trial], the judge’s options are limited 
by the jury’s presence and time constraints. The following, then, become the only possibilities: 
(1) discussing the issue in the jury’s hearing, thereby exposing the jury to the challenged evidence; 
(2) conducting a whispered sidebar debate; or (3) excusing the jurors and sending them to the 
deliberation room.”). 
 104. See DiBiagio, supra note 21, at 1243. 
 105. See Imwinkelried, supra note 23, at 731–32. In appropriate cases, a wise prosecutor 
will give notice and argue that evidence is admissible because it is intrinsic to the crime charged, 
and even if it is not, it is admissible under Rule 404(b) anyway. See, e.g., State v. McKinley 764 
S.E.2d 303, 314–15 (W. Va. 2014) (noting that the prosecution filed pre-trial notice in a murder 
case that it would seek to introduce prior acts of domestic violence perpetrated by the defendant 
against the victim, arguing that the evidence was admissible because it was intrinsic to the murder, 
and even if it was not, the evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b)). 
 106. See Imwinkelried, supra note 23, at 732 (“The defense may not merely assert that the 
references [to intrinsic evidence] are readily severable; the defense must actually show the judge, 
through [a] synopsis, how the severance can be effected.”). 
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Utah Rules of Evidence107 to determine whether the evidence is admis-
sible.108 If the judge rules that the evidence is admissible as intrinsic 
evidence, the judge should provide a limiting instruction forbidding 
the jury from convicting the defendant based on the defendant’s char-
acter.109 The instruction would also “explain why the jury is allowed to 
hear references to the uncharged misconduct.”110 
sfK==`lk`irpflk=
It is apparent that many Utah prosecutors overlook the intrinsic 
evidence doctrine when they seek to introduce evidence of other mis-
conduct committed by the defendant. Although Utah courts have rec-
ognized that Rule 404(b) does not apply to intrinsic evidence, it is ap-
parent that the intrinsic evidence doctrine is much more expansive 
than has been recognized thus far in Utah case law.111 Prosecutors 
should use the doctrine to its full extent to help jurors have a better 
and fuller understanding of the testimony they hear during trial. As the 
United States Supreme Court recognized in Old Chief v. United 
States, jurors have certain expectations concerning a party’s case, and 
“[i]f [jurors’] expectations are not satisfied, triers of fact may penalize 
the party who disappoints them by drawing a negative inference 
against that party.”112 Indeed, 
 
 107. Rule 403 provides, “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing 
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative 
evidence.” UTAH R. EVID. 403. 
 108. See United States v. Hall, 508 F. App’x 776, 779 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[I]ntrinsic evidence 
remains subject to analysis under Rule 403 and may not be admitted if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”); United States v. Irving, 665 F.3d 1184, 
1212 (10th Cir. 2011) (“If the contested evidence is intrinsic to the charged crime, then Rule 
404(b) is not even applicable. Of course, such evidence remains ‘subject to the requirement of 
Rule 403 that its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice.’”) (citations omitted). But see State v. Harris, 724 S.E.2d 133, 139 (W. Va. 2013) (“[H]is-
torical evidence of uncharged prior acts which is inextricably intertwined with the charged crime 
is admissible over a Rule 403 objection.”) (citation omitted). 
 109. See Imwinkelried, supra note 23, at 732–33. 
 110. Id. at 733 (“By way of example, suppose that the prosecution’s evidence was an audi-
otape recording on which the accused both described the charged offense and boasted about the 
uncharged misconduct. The references to the uncharged misconduct might be so closely com-
mingled with the statements about the charged crime that the redaction of the references would 
garble the tape to the point of incomprehensibility. If that was the only reason for the judge’s 
ruling permitting the jury to hear the references, the jury would be told precisely that.”). 
 111. See supra notes 23–86 and accompanying text. 
 112. 519 U.S. 172, 188–89 (1997) (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
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[t]he “fair and legitimate weight” of conventional evidence showing 
individual thoughts and acts amounting to a crime reflects the fact 
that making a case with testimony and tangible things not only        
satisfies the formal definition of an offense, but tells a colorful story 
with descriptive richness. . . . Evidence thus has force beyond any  
linear scheme of reasoning, and as its pieces come together a           
narrative gains momentum, with power not only to support            
conclusions but to sustain the willingness of jurors to draw the          
inferences, whatever they may be, necessary to reach an honest       
verdict. . . . Thus, the prosecution may fairly seek to place its             
evidence before the jurors, as much to tell a story of guiltiness as to 
support an inference of guilt, to convince the jurors that a guilty    
verdict would be morally reasonable as much as to point to the        
discrete elements of a defendant’s legal fault.113 
Prosecutors and courts should recognize that intrinsic evidence is 
necessary for jurors to have a complete understanding of the cases they 
are asked to hear, so they can decide those cases fairly. As the Supreme 
Court stated in Old Chief, 
People who hear a story interrupted by gaps of abstraction may be 
puzzled at the missing chapters, and jurors asked to rest a momentous 
decision on the story’s truth can feel put upon at being asked to take 
responsibility knowing that more could be said than they have heard. 
A convincing tale can be told with economy, but when economy      
becomes a break in the natural sequence of narrative evidence, an 
assurance that the missing link is really there is never more than     
second best.114 
Prosecutors have a heavy burden in establishing a defendant’s 
guilt, and they should endeavor to present the jury with a complete 
evidentiary story. This effort should include advocating for all avenues 
of admissibility of evidence, including the intrinsic evidence doctrine. 
The time for neglecting this doctrine has passed. 
 
 113. Id. at 187–88 (citations omitted). 
 114. Id. at 189. 
